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Abstract
Given the interdependences between human capital accumulation and technological change,
skill gaps may arise in equilibrium. However, they are not necessarily inefficient, and in this
paper we present a model in which the simple absence of such a skill gap can be inefficient.
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1.  Introduction
Technological change cannot expand without sufficiently qualified workers and, at
the  same  time,  workers’  productivity  is not independent of their assimilated  level of
technology. Empirical analysis provides evidence on the influence of human capital and
innovation on growth, as well as on the interdependence of these two phenomena.
Nevertheless, the results depend on the set of countries considered, with the influence of
these phenomena varying across economies, depending on some structural features. In this
regard, see Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Nonneman and
Vanhoudt (1996) and Murthy  and Chien (1997), among others. The identification of the
distinctive characteristics of the economies that  determine the influence of each of these
two activities on the rate at which the economy grows continues to be an open question.
One specific point is of particular interest, namely the question of skill  gaps,
understood as skill levels of the labour force that are below the frontier of the technological
knowledge. In our view, there is merit in proposing models in which this problem can be
analysed, and in this paper we present a model of endogenous technological change with
human capital accumulation inspired in Lucas  (1988)  and  Romer  (1990), in which we
introduce human capital obsolescence due to the expansion of knowledge in line with Zeng
(1997).
In this model we determine the conditions in which such skill  gaps appear and
discuss the efficiency of this deficit of workers’ skills with respect to the technological
frontier. As main conclusions, we find that the skill gaps arise in the market equilibrium
when innovation runs too fast and that they are not necessarily inefficient. In fact, for the
case we consider the gap is never inefficient, and the simple absence of such a gap appears
as inefficient.
2.  The model
The economy is composed by individuals that offer inelastically one unit of time in
the labour market each period, with the population normalised to one. The utility function





0  captures the welfare provided by the stream of consumption c  over
time, with ρ being the intertemporal discount rate. We consider four productive sectors: the
R&D sector, that give  rise to innovations; the intermediate goods sector, that produces
different varieties of capital goods; the final good sector; and the education sector.
Human capital accumulation. Let N be  the  range of the variety of intermediate
goods, which measures the technical level reached by the society, and let Ñ be the level of
the  knowledge  assimilated by workers (obviously, Ñ  ≤  N). We assume that the new
techniques are incorporated by firms even when workers have not incorporated the new
knowledge. Therefore, we allow for a gap between the production techniques and the
labour quality. Such a gap gives rise to losses in workers’ productivity.2
In order to increase their knowledge, workers devote a fraction uE of their time to




νν 1 , where δE is the productivity
parameter and ν ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, we assume that workers’ human capital increases with
the  acquired knowledge with elasticity ε,  HÑ =
ε, which implies that  human  capital
accumulation follows:






ε ν   , (1)
with δε δ HE = . As usual in human capital models, we assume δρ H > .
With productive processes changing over time, workers’ human capital becomes a
poor  indicator of their productivity. As an alternative indicator, and in line with  Zeng
(1997), we define the effective human capital as HE = H/N
ε, that is to say, the existing
human capital related to its maximum value attainable given the available technology. With
this formulation, the parameter ε can be interpreted as the degree of obsolescence that the
expansion of knowledge induces on human capital.
R&D. Following Romer (1990) and introducing the  effective human capital, the
technology of the R&D sector is given by:
Nu H N Nu H N NN NN
.
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where δN is a productivity parameter and uN is the fraction of time devoted to innovation.
This equation shares with Jones (1995) a greater flexibility with respect to the effects of
the stock of knowledge on its own expansion than is the case in Romer (1990), where the
influence is considered as linear.
Intermediate and final goods. The technology of the final good sector is:
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where uY is the fraction of time devoted to final good firms (uuu YNE ++= 1) and xi is the
amount of the i-th variety of capital. The symmetry in the use of each variety implies x =
xi. Each unit of every intermediate good is produced linearly from η units of final good, in
such a way that physical capital can be defined as  KN x =η . Taking this into account, the
final good technology becomes:
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−− − −
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11 1 1 . (4)
For the sake of clarity, we will concentrate on the case αεν ≥+, corresponding to
a direct influence of HE on final output which is no lower than the sum of the degree of
obsolescence the knowledge generates on human capital and its influence on education
1.
                                                
1 In the reverse case, the same possibilities would arise but it is more complex to delimit the circumstances
that lead to each of them.3
3.  Long-run effective human capital and the possibility of skill gaps
The steady state is characterised by a constant distribution of workers’ labour
supply among the different sectors and constant growth rates for output, consumption and
the different stocks, which implies gg g NH ==/ε (gz denotes the rate of growth of variable
z, whereas g stands for that of output,  which equals that of consumption and physical
capital).
Consumers maximise welfare subject to their budget constraint and the technology
of human capital accumulation. Let w be the wage received for each unit of human capital
hired by either final good firms or R&D firms, whereas r denotes the interest rate and f the


































This problem can be summarised by the following Hamiltonian:
H
c =+ − + − [] ++ − ()
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where qf and qH are the shadow prices of financial wealth and human capital, respectively,
and  λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint on human capital. The first
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Let us consider the case in which the constraint on human capital does not bind, so
that λ = 0 and HE <1. Conditions (5) and (7) imply that consumption grows according to
gr =− ρ. Carrying (6) to (8) we deduce the dynamics of the shadow price of human
capital. Then, taking time derivatives in (6) and making use of the previous results we
obtain
g
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From this expression, together with the technology of education given in (1), we deduce












On the other hand, from (4), the inverse demand functions for labour and for any
variety of capital on the part of competitive firms in the final good sector are given by:
wu H N K YY =
−− − − αη
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() , (11)
pu H N x Y =−
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αα ε α , (12)
where wY is the wage paid by the final good sector and p is the rental price of each unit of
every variety of intermediate goods.
Given the inverse demand function (12), the intermediate goods firms maximise their
profits by setting a rental price  pr =−
− () 1
1 αη , from which the monopolistic profit is given
by  πα = px. The competition to purchase the patents leads to a patent price PN equal to
the discounted future flow of monopolistic profits. With the profit being  constant in
steady state, this implies Pr N = π / .
The R&D firms pay to the human capital the competitive wage,  wP N NN N =
− δ
ε 1 ,
which after the substitution of the previous results can be written as
wu H N x r NN Y
a =−
−− − δα α
εα ε α () () / 1
11 . This wage equals the final good sector wage in (11) in
any equilibrium with innovation, what implies that  Hu g EN Y =− [] +
− () () 1
1 αδ ρ. From this
expression, together with equation (10) and the R&D technology given in (2), we obtain,
after some algebra, the following implicit equation that solves the steady state value of HE:
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It can be shown that  ′< G 0, ∂∂ δ HEH / > 0,  ∂∂ δ HEN / < 0 and ∂∂ ρ HE / < 0; that
is to say, G is a decreasing function and the effective human capital is increasing in the
productivity of education but decreasing in that of innovation and in the discount rate. For
HE to be strictly less than one, the condition G() 10 <  must hold, which is equivalent to
δδ
α δρε ν ρ












When this is not the case (δδ NN
d ≤ ), the equilibrium is a corner solution in which
HE =1. This means that, if the productivity of innovation δN is high enough relative to
that of education,δH, then the expansion of knowledge will take place at a rate which is too
fast to be assimilated by the workers, giving rise to a skill gap (HE <1). By contrast, when
δδ NN
d ≤ , the new knowledge is totally assimilated.5
The question we can now pose is whether or not the skill gap implied by the case
in which  HE <1 is reflecting an inefficient allocation of resources. In order to answer the
question, in the next section we solve the centralised solution and compare it with the
market equilibrium.
4.  Skill gaps and efficiency
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which can be summarised by the following Hamiltonian:
H
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where θK, θN and θH are the shadow prices of physical capital, knowledge and human
capital, respectively, and λ is again the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint on
human capital. The optimal solution verifies the following first order conditions:
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Let us assume first, as in the decentralised problem, that  HE <1, so that λ = 0.
Taking into account the relationships between the different growth rates in steady  state,
the two former equations imply that the stocks K, N and H increase over time at the same
rate at which their respective shadow prices decrease.  Making  use of this result, and
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whereas carrying (16) to (19) we obtain again equation (9). Thus, the expression (10),
which  results  from (9) and the technology of education, also holds in the centralised
solution. Then, the system of equations given by (10) and (20) allows us to obtain the
optimal long-run value of HE as the solution to the following (again implicit) equation:
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with the same properties as G in the market equilibrium. The condition that now ensures
that  HE <1 is G
p() 10 <  or, which is the same,
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δρ ε ν ρ










Therefore, when this condition holds, the skill  gaps  are  efficient. By contrast, when
δδ NN
p ≤ , the optimal allocation involves an effective human capital equal to one and thus
the existence of a skill gap is inefficient.
By comparing the critical values of the productivity of innovation in (14) and (22),
it is easy to show that, under our assumptions about the parameters, δN
d  is always above
δN
p.  As  a  consequence, whenever δδ NN
d > , both the centralised and the  decentralised
solutions involve a skill gap; in other words, the existence of such a skill gap in the market
allocation is not in itself an indicator of inefficiency. Whether the size of the gap is above or
below the optimal is a separate question.
The most surprising result arises when δδδ N
d
NN
p >> . Contrary to what could be
expected, in this case  the  centralised  allocation involves a skill gap, but the market
equilibrium does not. As a result, the absence of the skill gap appears as an indicator of
inefficiency.
Finally, when δδ N
p
N >  the workers assimilate all the knowledge in the market long-
run equilibrium, with this absence of a skill gap also being a characteristic of the optimal
allocation.
Why could it be optimal to maintain the knowledge assimilated by workers below
the technological frontier, when the market allocation leads to fully updated workers? This
seems a paradox, since the presence of skill gaps entails a social cost in that the lack of
knowledge on the part of workers limits the exploitation of the productivity gains derived
from the technical  progress. On the other hand, the full  updating of the individuals’
knowledge is also costly,  because it requires the corresponding investment in education.
Only in the circumstances where the productivity of education is high enough (relative to
that of innovation, as we have seen) can it be efficient to devote sufficient time to education
so as to assimilate all the new knowledge.7
Moreover, given that innovation involves important external effects (both positive
and negative), and that the intermediate goods market is not competitive, the market
allocation may involve too many or too few incentives for innovation. This last situation
arises when εα ≤  and, as a result of the slow innovation, the investment in education by
workers might be sufficiently large so as to acquire all the new knowledge, although this
feature is not shared by the optimal allocation.  
If we take the efficiency analysis a stage further, a new question arises: when the
skill gap is a feature of the market equilibrium and its existence is not inefficient (i.e., when
δδ NN
d > ), what can we say about whether the efficiency requires workers’ human capital to
be closer to, or further away from, the knowledge frontier? Let us compare equations (13)
and (21). Under our assumptions about the parameters, we have that
GH G H H H H E
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provided that  HE <1. As a result, the effective human capital in the market allocation is
above the optimal one: HH EE
p > . This means that the skill gap in the market equilibrium is
lower than its efficient level, a situation which we might refer to as “over-education”. Given
that the inverse relationship between the growth rate and the effective human capital in
(10) also holds in the optimal solution, this implies that the market growth rate is below
the optimal. This is due to a low investment in the sectors of human capital and knowledge
accumulation, which drive the growth in output. In fact, it can be shown that the fractions
of time devoted by the market allocation to education and innovation are both lower than
the efficient. The low investment in R&D reduces the obsolescence of human capital and,
despite the lower rate of human  capital  accumulation,  allows  human  capital to be




In this paper we have illustrated the way in which skill gaps may appear in an
economy with endogenous technological change. The key point is that some investment in
human  capital  accumulation  must accompany the expansion of knowledge in order to
exploit the potential productivity gains. As we have shown, such skill gaps appear as a
consequence of too rapid rate of innovation, induced by a productivity in the R&D sector
which is too high with respect to that of education.
Nevertheless, the existence of a skill gap cannot be considered as an indicator of
inefficiency. On the contrary, our model includes a case in which the inefficiency proceeds
precisely from the absence of such a gap. The cause for this seemingly paradoxical result is
a rate of innovation that is below the optimal, which implies a lower obsolescence of
human capital and allows for a full acquisition of knowledge through the investment in
education. This is in clear contrast with the higher optimal rate of innovation, which makes
such an investment too costly and gives rise to a skill gap.  
                                                
2  Relaxing the assumption αεν ≥+, the opposite result may arise, with a skill gap in the market
allocation higher than the optimal (“under-education”).8
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